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DECONSTRUCTING INVISIBLE WALLS: SOTOMAYOR’S
DISSENTS IN AN ERA OF IMMIGRATION EXCEPTIONALISM
KARLA MCKANDERS*
Our Constitution demands, and our country de-
serves, a Judiciary willing to hold the coordinate
branches to account when they defy our most sacred
legal commitments. Because the Court’s decision
today has failed in that respect, with profound re-
gret, I dissent.
—Justice Sonia Sotomayor1
I. SUBJECTING THE PLENARY POWERS DOCTRINE TO STRINGENT
STANDARD OF REVIEW
A. Travel Ban Case: Trump v. Hawaii
B. Ending Immigration Exceptionalism Through Exhaustive
Review of Executive Actions
II. EXECUTIVE ACTIONS RECONSTRUCTING OUR BORDERS MUST
ADHERE TO THE RULE OF LAW
A. Department of Homeland Security v. Board of Regents of
the University of California
B. Wolf v. Cook County
C. Barr v. East Bay Sanctuary Covenant
CONCLUSION
Since 2017, the U.S. Supreme Court has granted certiorari and
considered twenty immigration cases.2 In 2019, the Supreme Court
* Clinical Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University Law School. Thanks to Vanderbilt
University, School of Law students Cloe Anderson and Joshua Minton for excellent
research assistance. Thanks also to Professors Ragini Shah and Yolanda Vazquez for
their insightful feedback.
1. Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2448 (2018).
2. See Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Thuraissigiam, 140 S. Ct. 1959 (2020); Dep’t of
Homeland Sec. v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 140 S. Ct. 1891 (2020); Nasrallah v. Barr,
140 S. Ct. 1683 (2020); United States v. Sineneng-Smith, 140 S. Ct. 1575 (2020); Barton
v. Barr, 140 S. Ct. 1442 (2020); Guerrero-Lasprilla v. Barr, 140 S. Ct. 1062 (2020); Kansas
v. Garcia, 140 S. Ct. 791 (2020); Hernandez v. Mesa, 140 S. Ct. 735 (2020); Wolf v. Cook
Cnty., 140 S. Ct. 681 (2020); Barr v. East Bay Sanctuary Covenant, 140 S. Ct. 3 (2019);
Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 139 S. Ct. 2779 (2019) (mem.);
Dep’t of Com. v. New York, 139 S. Ct. 2551 (2019); Nielsen v. Preap, 139 S. Ct. 954 (2019);
Pereira v. Sessions, 138 S. Ct. 2105 (2018); Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204 (2018);
Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830 (2018); In re United States, 138 S. Ct. 443 (2017);
Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 377 (2017) (mem.); Trump v. Int’l Refugee Assistance Project,
138 S. Ct. 353 (2017) (mem.); Trump v. Int’l Refugee Assistance Project, 137 S. Ct. 2080
(2017); Lee v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 1958 (2017); Maslenjak v. United States, 137 S.
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issued eight decisions focusing on immigration.3 There are many
different theories accounting for the proliferation of immigration cases
on the Supreme Court’s docket. Some immigration scholars attrib-
ute the proliferation to the decline of the plenary powers doctrine,4
while others attribute the increase in the executive branch’s unilat-
eral actions restricting immigration in the United States.5
With the proliferation of immigration cases before the Supreme
Court, Justice Sonia Sotomayor has emerged as a strong voice of
dissent.6 Over the past few terms, Sotomayor has written more dis-
sents than any other Justice.7 The Article examines the impact her
Ct. 1918 (2017); Sessions v. Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. 1678 (2017); Esquivel-Quintana
v. Sessions, 137 S. Ct. 1562 (2017).
3. See Thuraissigiam, 140 S. Ct. at 1961 (discussing the constitutionality of
expedited removal of noncitizens); Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal.,
140 S. Ct. at 1891 (holding that the Department of Homeland Security’s decision to
rescind the DACA policy was arbitrary and capricious, in violation of the Administrative
Procedure Act); Nasrallah, 140 S. Ct. at 1683 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C)–(D) do not
preclude judicial review of a noncitizen’s factual challenges to an order denying relief
under the Convention Against Torture); Sineneng-Smith, 140 S. Ct. at 1575 (holding
principle of party presentation violated when the Ninth Circuit found First Amendment
overbreadth for statute prohibiting the inducement of immigration law violations);
Barton, 140 S. Ct. at 1442 (determining eligibility for cancellation of removal of a lawful
permanent resident who commits a crime, an offense listed in 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2) com-
mitted during the initial seven years of residence need not be one of the offenses of
removal); Guerrero-Lasprilla, 140 S. Ct. at 1062 (finding that “questions of law” in the
Immigration and Nationality Act’s 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D), include the application of a
legal standard to undisputed or established facts); Garcia, 140 S. Ct. at 791 (holding
federal immigration law did not preempt the Kansas identity fraud statutes); Hernandez,
140 S. Ct. at 735 (holding there is no private right of action for the family of a young
Mexican national who was killed by a United States border officer).
4. Kevin R. Johnson, Immigration in the Supreme Court, 2009–13: A New Era of
Immigration Law Unexceptionalism, 68 OKLA. L. REV. 57, 59 (2015).
5. Michele Waslin, The Use of Executive Orders and Proclamations to Create
Immigration Policy: Trump in Historical Perspective, 8 J. ON MIGRATION &HUM.SEC. 54,
54 (2020) (“Donald Trump’s overall volume of EOs has been remarkably similar to that
of other presidents, while his number of proclamations has been relatively high. His
immigration-related EOs and proclamations, however, diverge from those of his pre-
decessors in several ways. Of the 56 immigration-related EOs and 64 proclamations
issued since 1945, Trump has issued [ten] and nine, respectively. Overall, about [one]
percent of all EOs and proclamations during this period have been immigration related,
compared to [eight] percent of Trump’s EOs and 2.4 percent of Trump’s proclamations.”).
6. Kevin R. Johnson, Immigration Decisions in the 2019 Supreme Court Term,
Upcoming Cases in the 2020 Term, UC DAVIS SCH. OF L. FAC. BLOG (June 25, 2020),
https://facultyblog.law.ucdavis.edu/post/immigration-decisions-in-the-supreme-court
-2019-term-upcoming-cases-in-the-2020-term.aspx [http://perma.cc/SL6Q-ZLG3]; see also
Ali Shan Ali Bhai, A Border Deferred: Structural Safeguards against Judicial Deference
in Immigration National Security Cases, 69 DUKE L.J. 1149, 1166–67 (2020).
7. Adam Feldman, Empirical SCOTUS: Amid Record-Breaking Consensus, the
Justices’ Divisions Still Run Deep, SCOTUS BLOG (Feb. 25, 2019, 1:28 PM), https://www
.scotusblog.com/2019/02/empirical-scotus-amid-record-breaking-consensus-the-justices
-divisions-still-run-deep [http://perma.cc/XPC3-PU3C] (noting that during the 2019 term,
Justice Sotomayor was the Supreme Court’s most frequent dissenter in opinions and in
the Supreme Court’s shadow docket).
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dissents have on the theme of this symposium, Justice Along Bor-
ders. This Article focuses on how Justice Sotomayor’s recent im-
migration dissents force us to grapple with how the long-standing
plenary powers doctrine has privileged borders over our most sacred
legal commitments—fundamental rights under the constitution and
adherence to rule of law. This Article argues that Justice Sotomayor’s
immigration decisions provide a significant break in historical defer-
ence to executive actions and are forcing us to reconceptualize the
ways in which the immigration system historically has abrogated
the rights of immigrants of color.
In 2017, President Trump began an unprecedented upheaval of
the U.S. immigration system through executive orders, proclamations,
proposed regulations,8 and the referral of immigration cases to the At-
torney General.9 In many instances, the Administration has outrightly
stated that it would not follow existing immigration, constitutional,
or other laws to reach its goal of overhauling the immigration sys-
tem.10 This significant policy shift has resulted in multiple lawsuits
and injunctions halting executive actions.11 It has resulted in the
U.S. Solicitor General’s multiple unprecedented petitions to the Su-
preme Court to intervene and bypass existing court rules and proce-
dures.12 In many of the immigration cases, the Supreme Court is
balancing whether to defer to executive actions when immigration,
national security, and sovereignty are implicated against the xeno-
phobic and racist statements that implicate constitutional rights.13
During Justice Sotomayor’s eleven-year tenure on the bench,
she has become known as the Justice who consistently challenges
decisions that impact “minorities, immigrants, criminal defendants
and death row inmates.”14 Given her recent dissents, it is important
8. Waslin, supra note 5, at 54–64.
9. See, e.g., Castillo-Perez, 27 I&N Dec. 664 (A.G. 2019); Thomas and Thompson, 27
I&N Dec. 674 (A.G. 2019); Castro-Tum, 27 I&N Dec. 271 (A.G. 2018), overruled by Guillen
-Acosta v. Barr, 799 Fed. Appx. 212, 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS 10445, and Romero v. Barr,
937 F.3d 282, 2019 U.S. App. LEXIS 26241, 2019 WL 4065596; A-B-, 27 I&N Dec. 316
(A.G. 2018).
10. Allan Smith, ‘Unforgivable’: Trump’s Days of Immigration Statements Come
Under Fire, NBC NEWS (Apr. 14, 2019), https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/immigration
/unforgivable-trump-s-days-immigration-statements-come-under-fire-n994281 [http://
perma.cc/C43R-R75Y].
11. See Madison J. Scaggs, Comment, How Nationwide Injunctions Have Thwarted
Recent Immigration Policy, 105 IOWA L. REV. 1447, 1448 (2020).
12. See Stephen I. Vladeck, The Solicitor General and the Shadow Docket, 133 HARV.
L. REV. 123, 124 (2019).
13. Neil S. Siegel, The Supreme Court Is Avoiding Talking About Race, THEATLANTIC
(Aug. 7, 2020), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/08/supreme-court-doesn’t
-like-talk-about-race/614944 [http://perma.cc/3SUV-P6HZ].
14. Richard Wolf, “The People’s Justice”: After Decade on Supreme Court, Sonia
Sotomayor Is Most Outspoken on Bench and off, USA TODAY (Aug. 8, 2019, 3:01 AM),
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to examine their impact on the United States immigration system
and how they challenge existing norms that permeate the history of
immigration laws in the United States.15 Her dissents have also
challenged the Court’s shadow docket in issuing orders that do not
make it to the oral argument calendar by issuing written dissenting
opinions.16 In addition, Justice Sotomayor’s recent dissents must be
placed in context of the overall trajectory of her jurisprudence on im-
migration cases. In 2014, immigration law scholar Cristina Rodríguez,
in Uniformity and Integrity in Immigration Law: Lessons from the
Decisions of Justice (and Judge) Sotomayor, focused on the theorical
value of Justice Sotomayor’s immigration opinions within the “messier
reality” of the immigration system.17
Through her decisions, Sotomayor has established a record of forc-
ing the country to examine discriminatory immigration norms. In her
first 2009 opinion as a Justice, Mohawk Industries, Inc. v. Carpenter,
she challenged the use of the term illegal in reference to people.18 At
a Yale Symposium, Justice Sotomayor explained the need for the
Court to weigh in on public discourse on the term illegal. She stated:
To dub every immigrant a criminal because they’re undocumented,
to call them “illegal aliens,” seemed, and has seemed, insulting to
me. Many of these people are people I know, and they’re no differ-
ent than the people I grew up with or who share my life. And
they’re human beings with a serious legal problem, but the word
“illegal” alien made them sound like those other kinds of criminals.
And I think people then paint those individuals as something
less than worthy human beings. And it changes the conversation
when you recognize that this is a different—it’s a regulatory prob-
lem. We’ve criminalized a lot of it, but it started as, and funda-
mentally remains, a regulatory problem, not a criminal one. And
so that’s why I chose my words.19
Justice Sotomayor’s dissents challenge existing norms within the
United States immigration system, which has deference baked into its
structure.20 Her dissents demonstrate a pattern of requiring adherence
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2019/08/08/justice-sonia-sotomayor-su
preme-court-liberal-hispanic-decade-bench/1882245001 [http://perma.cc/FBG8-9SBJ].
15. See Cristina M. Rodríguez, Uniformity and Integrity in Immigration Law: Lessons
from the Decisions of Justice (and Judge) Sotomayor, 123 YALE L.J. F. 499, 500, 506, 510
(2014).
16. Wolf v. Cook Cnty., 140 S. Ct. 681 (2020); Barr v. East Bay Sanctuary Covenant,
140 S. Ct. 3 (2019).
17. Rodríguez, supra note 15, at 500.
18. See Mohawk Industries, Inc. v. Carpenter, 558 U.S. 100, 103–04 (2009).
19. Justice Sonia Sotomayor & Linda Greenhouse, A Conversation with Justice
Sotomayor, 123 YALE L.J. F. 375, 387 (2014).
20. Johnson, supra note 4, at 64.
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to process and demanding that the Court examine the Administra-
tion’s policies in context of their xenophobic and discriminatory
rhetoric.21 The dissents recognize that, where the structure of the
immigration system requires deference, there is a corresponding need
to adhere to procedure where decisions disproportionately impact
immigrant communities based upon their race, gender, and class.22
Since 2017, Justice Sotomayor’s dissenting opinions have fo-
cused on strict adherence to process and procedure, while pushing
the Supreme Court to not ignore the discriminatory and xenophobic
context and motivation of the President’s immigration executive ac-
tions.23 In conceptualizing how her opinions impact race, gender,
and social justice, this Article highlights two important functions of
her dissents for justice at the borders: (1) forcing future courts to bal-
ance the longstanding plenary powers doctrine when executive actions
are rife with discriminatory animus; and (2) the need to strictly adhere
to process24 when the Court is upholding doctrines that privilege
executive actions that disproportionately impact immigrants of color.
The last Part of the Article considers the impact of her decisions at
the intersection of race, gender, and immigration status by evaluating
how her decisions might “appeal . . . to the intelligence of a future
day”;25 propel legislative action;26 and serve the public role of signal-
ing to marginalized communities that someone is listening.27
I. SUBJECTING THE PLENARY POWERS DOCTRINE TO
STRINGENT STANDARD OF REVIEW
This Section discusses Justice Sotomayor’s dissent in Trump v.
Hawaii.28 This dissent must be placed in the context of the plenary
powers doctrine. Historically, through the plenary powers doctrine,
21. Tracey L. Meares & Tom R. Tyler, Justice Sotomayor and the Jurisprudence of
Procedural Justice, 123 YALE L.J. F. 525, 527 (2014).
22. See Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 140 S. Ct. 1891,
1917–18 (2020) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
23. Meares & Tyler, supra note 21, at 526.
24. Id. (defining Justice Sotomayor’s jurisprudence as one focused on process that
emphasizes making decisions fairly).
25. See Hon. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, The Role of Dissenting Opinions, 95 MINN. L.
REV. 1, 4 (2010) (“A dissent in a Court of last resort is an appeal . . . to the intelligence
of a future day, when a later decision may possibly correct the error into which the
dissenting judge believes the court to have been betrayed.”).
26. See id. at 7 (citing as example Justice Ginsburg’s own dissent in Ledbetter v.
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618 (2007)).
27. Meares & Tyler, supra note 21, at 539 (stating that Justice Sotomayor “has her
finger on the pulse of the American public and hence has a good sense of how to create
and maintain legitimacy for the Court and its decisions”).
28. Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2433 (2018).
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courts have deferred to the political branches’ authority to regulate
immigration.29 Immigration scholar Kevin Johnson posits that the
increase in this Administration’s executive orders might expand the
constitutional rights of immigrants where traditionally the execu-
tive branch’s decisions have been subjected to limited review.30 This
Section discusses how Sotomayor’s dissent in Trump v. Hawaii chal-
lenges the longstanding precedent of immigration exceptionalism in
subjecting executive actions to a stringent standard of review where
the constitutional rights of immigrants of color and religious minori-
ties are implicated.31
A. Travel Ban Case: Trump v. Hawaii
On September 24, 2017, the President issued a Proclamation
entitled Enhancing Vetting Capabilities and Processes for Detecting
Attempted Entry Into the United States.32 In Trump v. Hawaii (also
known as the Travel Ban Case), the plaintiffs challenged the Presi-
dent’s 2017 Proclamations and Orders restricting the entry of foreign
nationals from Muslim majority countries.33 The President issued
the Orders asserting:
[C]ertain entry restrictions were necessary to “prevent the entry
of those foreign nationals about whom the United States Gov-
ernment lacks sufficient information”; “elicit improved identity
management and information sharing protocols and practices
from foreign governments”; and otherwise “advance [the] foreign
policy, national security, and counterterrorism objectives of the
United States. Proclamation § 1(h).”34
The plaintiffs argued that the President’s Orders and Proclamation
violated the Immigration and Nationality Act and the Establish-
ment Clause of the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution where
the orders were “motivated not by concerns pertaining to national
security but by [a discriminatory] animus toward Islam.”35
The procedural history of this case and the enactment of the
executive orders are very important to understand the context in
which Sotomayor wrote her dissent. In January 2017, President
29. Kevin R. Johnson, Immigration and Civil Rights in the Trump Administration:
Law and Policy Making by Executive Order, 57 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 611, 659 (2017).
30. Id. at 615–16.
31. Trump, 138 S. Ct. at 2441.
32. Id. at 2404.
33. Id. at 2406.
34. Id. at 2405.
35. Id. at 2406.
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Trump signed Executive Order 13769—Protecting the Nation from
Foreign Terrorist Entry Into the United States.36 The Order banned
the entry of immigrants from seven Muslim majority countries.37
Multiple civil rights organizations and individuals filed lawsuits in
Hawaii, Washington, and the District of Columbia.38 After the law-
suits were filed, the Ninth Circuit39 and the United States District
Court for District of Columbia40 issued nationwide injunctions
halting the enforcement of the travel ban. After the injunction, the
President revoked the Order and replaced it with Executive Order
13780.41 This Order removed Iraq from the list of travel banned
countries.42 Thereafter, the President issued many revisions to the
orders, in some instances removing countries that he deemed com-
plied with the orders’ requirements.43
The Supreme Court upheld the travel ban in a 5–4 decision.44
Four of the Supreme Court Justices believed that an anti-Muslim ani-
mus motivated the Administration’s travel ban.45 Justice Sotomayor
authored a dissenting opinion, which Justice Ginsburg joined.46 Jus-
tice Sotomayor’s dissent extensively documented Trump’s words dur-
ing and after the 2016 campaign and asked the question whether a
reasonable observer would conclude that the proclamation was
motivated by anti-Muslim animus.47 In the dissent, she stated:
The Court’s decision today fails to safeguard that fundamental
principle. It leaves undisturbed a policy first advertised openly and
36. Davide De Lungo, Protecting the Nation From Foreign Terrorist Entry Into the
United States: A Constitutional Analysis of President Trump’s Executive Orders, 9 ITALIAN
J. PUB. L. 189, 190 (2017).
37. See Trump, 138 S. Ct. at 2403.
38. See, e.g., Complaint, Washington v. Trump, 847 F.3d 1151 (9th Cir. 2017) (No.
2:17-cv-00141-JLR); Complaint, Ali v. Trump, No. C17-0135JLR (W.D. Wash. Jan. 30,
2017); Complaint, Arab Am. Civil Rights League v. Trump, 399 F. Supp. 3d 717 (E.D.
Mich. 2017) (No. 2:17-cv-10310-VAR-SDD); Complaint, Hawaii v. Trump, 233 F. Supp.
3d 850 (D. Haw. 2017) (No. 17-00050 DKW-KJM); Complaint, Pars Equal. Ctr. v. Trump,
No. 1:17-cv-00255 (TSC) (D.D.C. Feb. 8, 2017); Complaint, Int’l Refugee Assistance Project
v. Trump, 404 F. Supp. 3d 946 (D. Md. 2017) (No. 8:17-cv-00361-TDC); Complaint, Uni-
versal Muslim Ass’n of Am., Inc. v. Trump, No. 1:17-cv-00537-TSC (D.D.C. Mar. 27, 2017);
Complaint, Iranian Alliances Across Borders v. Trump, No. 8:17-cv-02921-GJH (D. Md.
Oct. 2, 2017); Complaint, Zakzok v. Trump, No. 1:17-cv-02969-GLR (D. Md. Oct. 6, 2017).
39. Washington v. Trump, 847 F.3d 1151, 1169 (9th Cir. 2017).
40. Pars Equal. Ctr. v. Trump, No. 17-cv-0255 (TSC), 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 70512,
at *13 (D.D.C. March 2, 2018).
41. De Lungo, supra note 36, at 191.
42. See Trump, 138 S. Ct. at 2404.
43. See id. at 2403–06 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
44. Id. at 2402; see also Kevin R. Johnson, Keynote to Immigration in the Trump Era
Symposium: Judicial Review and the Immigration Laws, 48 SW. L. REV. 463, 465 (2019).
45. See Trump, 138 S. Ct. at 2433 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
46. Id. at 2433.
47. Id. at 2434–36.
102 WM. & MARY J. RACE, GENDER & SOC. JUST. [Vol. 27:095
unequivocally as a “total and complete shutdown of Muslims enter-
ing the United States” because the policy now masquerades behind
a façade of national-security concerns. But this repackaging does
little to cleanse Presidential Proclamation No. 9645 of the ap-
pearance of discrimination that the President’s words have cre-
ated. Based on the evidence in the record, a reasonable observer
would conclude that the Proclamation was motivated by anti-
Muslim animus.48
Further, the dissent firmly asserted: “[w]hatever the merits of plain-
tiffs’ complex statutory claims, the Proclamation must be enjoined
for a more fundamental reason: It runs afoul of the Establishment
Clause’s guarantee of religious neutrality.”49 The dissent asserts
that the Court should subject an administration’s immigration de-
cisions to strict review when there is strong evidence of the presence
of discriminatory animus.50 Her dissent began by evaluating the
constitutionality of the Presidential Proclamation under the First
Amendment’s Establishment Clause.51
Her dissent provided a historical overview of the President’s
anti-Muslim comments through the issuance of the Executive Or-
ders and Presidential Proclamations.52 She provided the historical
background of the Executive Orders as the basis of her dissent and
posited that the Executive Orders could not be separated from their
origins.53 Given the President’s statements, Sotomayor concluded:
Ultimately, what began as a policy explicitly “calling for a total
and complete shutdown of Muslims entering the United States”
has since morphed into a “Proclamation” putatively based on
national-security concerns. But this new window dressing can-
not conceal an unassailable fact: the words of the President and
his advisers create the strong perception that the Proclamation
is contaminated by impermissible discriminatory animus against
Islam and its followers.54
The dissent prioritized an individual’s constitutional rights over
immigration and national security priorities.55 While the majority
set aside the President’s statements and encouraged deference to
48. Id. at 2433.
49. Id. at 2433–34.
50. See id. at 2440–41.
51. Trump, 138 S. Ct. at 2434–35.
52. Id. at 2435–38.
53. See id. at 2438.
54. Id. at 2440.
55. See id.
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immigration and national security matters,56 the dissent posited that
the majority “incorrectly applie[d] a watered-down legal standard in
an effort to short circuit plaintiffs’ Establishment Clause claim.”57
Justice Sotomayor distinguished the cases on which the major-
ity relied, Kerry v. Din58 and Kleindienst v. Mandel,59 asserting that
they were not applicable. For Sotomayor, the distinguishing factors
in Din and Mandel were that the cases “involved . . . [the] Executive
Branch[’s] decision to exclude a single foreign national under a spe-
cific . . . ground of inadmissibility.”60 Whereas, in Trump v. Hawaii,
the travel ban impacted millions of people on a single categorical
basis—their religion.61 She further posited that Mandel and Din did
not attempt to create a “framework for adjudicating cases (like this
one) involving claims that the executive branch violated the Estab-
lishment Clause by acting pursuant to an unconstitutional purpose.”62
For Sotomayor, these two factors were dispositive.
Certainly, Justice Sotomayor’s analysis extends beyond the tra-
ditional deference courts have given to immigration executive actions.
In the dissent, she clearly signaled to future courts how to balance
the longstanding plenary powers doctrine when executive actions
contain a discriminatory animus.63 She asserted:
[E]ven assuming that Mandel and Din apply here, they would
not preclude us from looking behind the face of the Proclamation
because plaintiffs have made “an affirmative showing of bad faith,”
by the President who, among other things, instructed his subor-
dinates to find a “lega[l]” way to enact a Muslim ban . . . .64
She highlighted the fact that the Court has not ruled on a simi-
lar case where a President issued a Proclamation excluding a large
segment of one particular religion.65
B. Ending Immigration Exceptionalism Through Exhaustive
Review of Executive Actions
This dissent is significant for two reasons. First, the dissent high-
lighted the ways in which the majority opinion is similar to the case
56. Id. at 2440.
57. Trump, 138 S. Ct. at 2440.
58. Kerry v. Din, 576 U.S. 86, 88–89 (2015).
59. Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 767–68 (1972).
60. Trump, 138 S. Ct. 2440 n.5.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. See id. at 2441 n.6.
64. Id. at 2440 n.5.
65. See id. at 2441 n.6.
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in which overturned Korematsu v. United States.66 The Korematsu de-
cision similarly deferred to a racist and xenophobic presidential policy
that interred Japanese Americans.67 Second, the dissent challenged
the plenary powers doctrine when constitutional rights are implicated
under the Establishment Clause.68 Similar to the Administration’s
Muslim Ban, the Supreme Court in Korematsu “gave ‘a pass [to] an
odious, gravely injurious racial classification’ authorized by an ex-
ecutive order.”69
Sotomayor emphasized the parallel nature of both cases where
the government “invoked an ill-defined national security threat to
justify an exclusionary policy of sweeping proportion.”70 The dissent
drew parallels between the travel ban and the government in
Korematsu’s policies that were similarly based in discriminatory
stereotypes to justify exclusionary immigration policies.71 Both the
Hawaii and Korematsu decisions were based in xenophobic and
discriminatory notions that a particular group could not assimilate
and thus was a national security risk to the United States.72 Justice
Sotomayor quotes, in full, Justice Murphy’s dissent in Korematsu:
“‘[I]t is essential that there be definite limits to [the government’s]
discretion,’ as ‘[i]ndividuals must not be left impoverished of their
constitutional rights on a plea of military necessity that has neither
substance nor support.’”73 Justice Murphy’s language could be easily
supplanted into Sotomayor’s dissent in Trump v. Hawaii. Like the
dissenting Justices in Korematsu, Sotomayor’s dissent presages how
the majority’s opinion may similarly harm the “constitutional fab-
ric.”74 She powerfully stated:
This formal repudiation of a shameful precedent is laudable and
long overdue. But it does not make the majority’s decision here
acceptable or right. By blindly accepting the Government’s mis-
guided invitation to sanction a discriminatory policy motivated
by animosity toward a disfavored group, all in the name of a
superficial claim of national security, the Court redeploys the
66. See Trump, 138 S. Ct. at 2447–48 (citing Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S.
214, 215 (1944)).
67. See Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 217, 219.
68. See Trump, 138 S. Ct. at 2440–41.
69. Id. at 2447.
70. Id. (citing Brief for Japanese American Citizens League as Amicus Curiae
Supporting Petitioner, Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (No. 22), 1944
WL 42852, at *12–14).
71. Id.
72. Id. at 2447–48 (citing Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 236–40 (Murphy, J., dissenting)).
73. Id. at 2448 (citing Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 234 (Murphy, J., dissenting)).
74. Trump, 138 S. Ct. at 2447–48.
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same dangerous logic underlying Korematsu and merely replaces
one “gravely wrong” decision with another.75
In addition to drawing parallels between Korematsu and the instant
case, Sotomayor called for a thorough examination of the intent
behind the facially neutral Presidential Proclamation and, unlike
the majority, she would have applied “a more stringent standard of
review.”76 Justice Sotomayor asserted, however, that under any form
of review—heightened or rational basis—the administrative actions
were unconstitutional.77
Justice Sotomayor enumerated the President’s multiple state-
ments to demonstrate the President’s discriminatory animus. For
example:
• Campaign trail statement from President—“Statement
on Preventing Muslim Immigration” that called for a
“total and complete shutdown of Muslims entering the
United States until our country’s representatives can
figure out what is going on.”78
• Candidate Trump also stated, “Islam hates us” and
asserted that the United States was “having problems
with Muslims coming into the country.”79
• Shortly after being elected, when asked whether vio-
lence in Europe had affected his plans to “ban Muslim
immigration,” the President replied, “You know my
plans. All along, I’ve been proven to be right.”80
Sotomayor asserted that the Presidential Proclamations could
not be separated from their “express hostility toward Muslims.”81
She intentionally cited to the voluminous record evidence of anti-
Muslim animus to support the conclusion that the Proclamation did
not have a legitimate basis.82 The dissent cited to the Constitutional
Law Scholars Amicus Brief, which argued that when there is a
discriminatory animus, presidential deference to executive actions
should not be upheld.83 The amicus asserted, “no matter how many
75. Id. at 2448.
76. See id. at 2441.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 2417.
79. Id.
80. Trump, 138 S. Ct. at 2417.
81. Id. at 2441–42.
82. Id. at 2442.
83. See id. at 2443.
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officials affix their names to it, the Proclamation rests on a rotten
foundation.”84
A hallmark of many of Justice Sotomayor’s opinions is her focus
on procedural fairness.85 Her immigration dissents similarly focus
on whether the Administration’s executive actions adhere to the
proper procedure; and the Court’s adherence to proper procedural
rules.86 She highlighted the fact that in issuing the Executive Orders,
the President engaged in an administrative review process that was
not disclosed to the public.87 She stated, “[i]gnoring all this, the major-
ity empowers the President to hide behind an administrative review
process that the Government refuses to disclose to the public.”88
Pointing back to the structure of the Immigration and Nationality
Act, she stated that the remedy for which the President allegedly
sought to address in his orders would be to simply rely upon the struc-
ture of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), which already
accounted for the concerns the President seeks to address.89 The statu-
tory scheme of the INA “already . . . fulfills the putative national-
security interests the Government now puts forth to justify the
Proclamation. Tellingly, the Government remains wholly unable to
articulate any credible national-security interest that would go unad-
dressed by the current statutory scheme absent the Proclamation.”90
The standard that emerges from the dissent is one that dimin-
ishes the plenary powers doctrine and immigration exceptionalism.91
The standard would eliminate automatic deference and subject the
executive branch’s immigration decisions to constitutional norms.92
The dissent is suggesting that the political branches’ immigration
actions should be subjected to constitutional review.93
Justice Sotomayor’s dissent must be placed within the wider
context of Supreme Court immigration jurisprudence and the ple-
nary powers doctrine. Historically, the Supreme Court has been
extremely deferential to the political branches’ authority over immi-
gration.94 This deference has been upheld even when violations of
84. Id. (quoting Brief for Constitutional Law Scholars as Amici Curiae).
85. Id. at 2442–43.
86. Trump, 138 S. Ct. at 2442–44.
87. See Trump, 138 S. Ct. at 2443.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 2443–44.
90. Id. at 2444.
91. See id.
92. See id.
93. See Trump, 138 S. Ct. at 2441 n.6.
94. See Karla Mari McKanders, Federal Preemption and Immigrants’ Rights, 3 WAKE
FOREST J.L. & POL’Y 333, 340 (2013).
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individual constitutional rights are alleged.95 “[T]he history of Amer-
ica’s immigration laws gives us insight into categories of people who
were undesirable during a particular moment in our nation’s history
and justification for closely monitoring the constitutionality of laws
that target immigrant populations.”96 The Chinese Exclusion Act
cases demonstrate the depth of the plenary powers doctrine.97 These
cases provide the foundation for excluding immigration laws from
judicial review when a discriminatory animus is present.98 Since the
Chinese Exclusion Act cases, the plenary powers doctrine has lim-
ited how far individual constitutional rights extend to immigrants.99
This doctrine is based upon the idea that a country, as a sovereign,
has the ability to create laws that are in their own interest.100 “Tra-
ditionally immigration laws are considered a nation’s prerogative[,]
as a nation-state has the ability to discriminate against who is
permitted to enter.”101
95. See id. (“[T]he Plenary Powers Doctrine has shielded congressional immigration
determinations from substantive constitutional review.”); see also Johnson, supra note
44, at 465 (“One of the foundations of immigration law has been something called the
‘plenary power doctrine,’ which is akin to a constitution-free zone for the immigration
laws and, at times, Executive actions.”).
96. McKanders, supra note 94, at 341.
97. See id.
98. See Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792 (1977) (“ ‘[O]ver no conceivable subject is the
legislative power of Congress more complete than it is over’ the admission of aliens.”
(quoting Oceanic Navigation Co. v. Stranahan, 214 U.S. 320, 339 (1909))); Chae Chan
Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 603–04 (1889) (laying out the plenary powers
doctrine which attributed the power as inherent to a sovereign nation); see also Chris
Nwachukwu Okeke & James A.R. Nafziger, United States Migration Law: Essentials for
Comparison, 54 AM. J. COMP. L. 531, 544 (2006) (stating “a cardinal doctrine of United
States constitutional law is that Congress has an inherent, plenary power in matters of
immigration”); Peter J. Spiro, Learning to Live with Immigration Federalism, 29 CONN.
L.REV. 1627, 1630 (1997) (“[T]he federal government has enjoyed a virtual carte blanche
on immigration matters.”).
99. See Kerry Abrams, Plenary Power Preemption, 99 VA.L. REV. 601, 601 (2013); see
also Johnson, supra note 44, at 465 (defining characteristic of plenary powers doctrine
as “immigration exceptionalism”).
100. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 225 (1982) (“Drawing upon [its Article I, section
8] power, upon its plenary authority with respect to foreign relations and international
commerce, and upon the inherent power of a sovereign to close its borders, Congress has
developed a complex scheme governing admission to our Nation and status within our
borders.”); see also Fiallo, 430 U.S. at 787 (“Our cases ‘have long recognized the power
to expel or exclude aliens as a fundamental sovereign attribute exercised by the Gov-
ernment’s political departments . . . .’ ”); League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Wilson,
908 F. Supp. 755, 768 (C.D. Cal. 1995) (citing Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S.
651, 659 (1892) (recognizing the inherent power of a sovereign nation to control its
borders)); Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 705 (1893) (pointing out that
the Constitution vests the national government with absolute control over international
relations); Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. at 603 (stating that the government’s power to
exclude aliens from the United States is not open to controversy).
101. McKanders, supra note 94, at 340 (citing Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. at 603–04).
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Immigration systems and borders are predicated on membership
and belonging. Membership and belonging are narrowly construed
and available to a limited few. The plenary powers doctrine affirms
that sovereign nations inherently have the power to exclude or in-
clude noncitizens from its borders based upon criteria on which its
citizenry decides through elected officials.102
Historically, the immigration system’s structure has given the
political branches unfettered discretion over who enters and exits
the country.103 The Supreme Court has limited powers to review the
congressional actions and the President’s discretion.104 The political
branches’ authority to regulate immigration is an inherent power—
as a sovereign the President can conduct foreign affairs and make
decisions to protect the country’s national security and implicate for-
eign affairs.105 This is a political question. There has been a histori-
cal progression of federal regulation of immigration that has led to
judicial deference to congressional and executive actions.106
Historically, the criteria upon which immigration laws are based
have been discriminatory.107 Immigration laws have been based on
societal bias and prejudices, reinforced existing class and wealth
structures, or included arbitrary reasons for exclusion and inclusion.108
In the United States, immigration laws have operated to maintain
homogeneity to the exclusion of immigrants of color.109 Immigration
laws have traditionally utilized fear and exclusion to define what
America should look like, privileging the entry of immigrants of
European descent.110
102. See id. at 340–42; see also Abrams, supra note 99, at 611–18.
103. Anne Y. Lee, The Unfettered Executive: Is There an Inherent Presidential Power
to Exclude Aliens?, 39 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 223, 228, 240 (2005).
104. See id. at 228.
105. Id. at 238–41.
106. See Stephen H. Legomsky, Immigration Law and the Principle of Plenary Con-
gressional Power, 1984 SUP.CT.REV. 255, 258–60 (1984). From this historical progression,
immigration laws and executive actions have been subjected to limited review creating
a form of immigration exceptionalism—especially when citizens’ and noncitizens’ funda-
mental constitutional rights are implicated.
107. See McKanders, supra note 94, at 334–35.
108. See id. at 343–44.
109. See id.; see also Daina C. Chiu, The Cultural Defense: Beyond Exclusion, Assimi-
lation, and Guilty Liberalism, 82 CAL. L. REV. 1053, 1059, 1066–68 (1994).
110. See McKanders, supra note 94, at 341–44; see also Emergency Immigration Act
of 1921, the Immigration Restriction Act of 1921, the Per Centum Law, and the Johnson
Quota Act, ch. 8, 42 Stat. 5 (the Quota law placed numerical restrictions on certain nation-
alities limiting migration from southern and eastern Europe. The restrictions greatly
impacted the demographics of the United States until the 1964 Immigration Act removed
numerical restrictions forever altering the demographics of noncitizens immigrating to
the United States).
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The Court’s 5–4 Hawaii v. Trump decision is a step towards sub-
jecting executive actions to a “stringent standard of review,”111 when,
as here, the First Amendment Establishment Clause and freedom
of religion are implicated. When this occurs, the dissent would have
courts examine facially neutral statutes to “discern” whether the
executive policy bears “a relationship to legitimate state interests.”112
The analysis would involve a rigorous examination into the history
that leads up to the promulgation of the executive actions and a
rigorous analysis of executive action in relation to the statutory
framework of the Immigration and Nationality Act. If this standard
were applied, this would reorient the immigration system which has
historically been highly deferential to executive and congressional
authority and, in very limited circumstances has prioritized consti-
tutional rights.113
II. EXECUTIVE ACTIONS RECONSTRUCTING OUR BORDERS
MUST ADHERE TO THE RULE OF LAW
A theme throughout Sotomayor’s dissents is that the executive
branch should not be exempt from complying with the rule of law.114
In multiple speeches, she has focused on how strict adherence to pro-
cess and procedure provides a necessary legitimating function to the
courts.115 Sotomayor asserts, “And I can live with that if I perceive
the process to be fair.”116 Justice Sotomayor has been called the Peo-
ple’s Justice for her constant desire to create and maintain the
Supreme Court’s legitimacy with the public.117 Accordingly, her recent
immigration dissents focus on curtailing administrative actions that
attempt to reconstruct borders without adhering to the rule of law.118
The following section discusses two different categories of dis-
sents that serve the same function—eliminating immigration excep-
tionalism through adherence to the rule of law. First, in Department
of Homeland Security v. Regents of the University of California,
Sotomayor’s dissent asserts that the majority erred in not permit-
ting the case to proceed beyond the summary judgment stage for the
111. Four justices reviewed the executive actions under a heightened standard of
review. Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2441 (2018).
112. Id. at 2441–42.
113. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 225 (1982).
114. See Meares & Tyler, supra note 21, at 529.
115. See id. at 526, 528–29.
116. Id. at 527.
117. Id. at 539 (“[T]he Justice has her finger on the pulse of the American public and
hence has a good sense of how to create and maintain legitimacy for the Court and its
decisions.”).
118. See Waslin, supra note 5, at 54–65.
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examination and development of the plaintiffs’ discrimination
claims.119 Second, in Wolf v. Cook County and Barr v. East Bay Sanc-
tuary Covenant, her dissent highlights the extraordinary measures
the Court took in considering lifting lower courts’ injunctions at a
procedurally premature stage in the case.120
A. Department of Homeland Security v. Board of Regents of the
University of California
The Supreme Court’s decision in Department of Homeland
Security v. Regents of the University of California121 considered the
narrow issue of whether the Department of Homeland Security’s
(DHS) rescission of the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA)
program complied with the Administrative Procedures Act (APA).122
Justice Roberts wrote the majority opinion.123 Justice Sotomayor con-
curred in part and dissented in part from the majority decision.124
The majority decision did not rule on the legality of DACA and
the Administration’s rescission of DACA.125 Correspondingly, as
addressed in Justice Sotomayor’s dissent, the decision did not hold
that the Administration’s actions in rescinding DACA were under-
girded by a discriminatory animus towards the Latinx community.126
The Court’s decision was limited to the legal issue of whether the
Department of Homeland Security properly followed the APA when
it rescinded DACA.127 The Court held DHS did not.128
The majority held that the Department of Homeland Security
failed to fully consider both: (1) the forbearance that DACA extends to
its recipients; and (2) that DACA recipients have a “reliance inter-
est” in the benefits it confers—work authorization, social security,
and Medicare.129 While the Court’s opinion affirmed core principles
of agency accountability and public confidence not convenience, the
majority’s opinion is very narrow.130 The decision left open the
119. See Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 140 S. Ct. 1891, 1917
(2020).
120. See Wolf v. Cook Cnty., 140 S. Ct. 681, 681–83 (2020).
121. See Trump v. NAACP, 139 S. Ct. 2779 (2019) (consolidating Batalla Vidal v.
Nielsen, 291 F. Supp. 3d 260 (E.D.N.Y. 2018) and Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. U.S.
Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 908 F.3d 476 (9th Cir. 2018)).
122. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 140 S. Ct. at 1905.
123. Id. at 1901.
124. Id. at 1916 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part).
125. Id. at 1905.
126. Id. at 1915–16.
127. Id. at 1916.
128. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 140 S. Ct. at 1910, 1916–17.
129. Id. at 1906, 1914, 1929–30.
130. See id. at 1916.
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possibility that the Administration could comply with the APA and
rescind DACA.131
Justice Sotomayor concurred with the majority’s holding that
the rescission of DACA violated the APA, yet she dissented with the
majority’s decision to foreclose review of the plaintiff’s equal protec-
tion claims, given the procedural posture of the case.132 She asserted
that the procedural posture of the case—at the motion to dismiss
stage—precluded respondents from being able to fully develop the
record on their equal protection claims.133 Unlike the majority, the
dissent suggests that the disparate impact of the rescission on the
Latinx community could not be considered in isolation of the Presi-
dent’s policy agenda.134
Justice Sotomayor cited some of the Administration’s statements
asserted in the complaints as evidence that the record needed further
development.135 She cited: “The Batalla Vidal complaints catalog
then-candidate Trump’s declarations that Mexican immigrants are
‘people that have lots of problems,’ ‘the bad ones,’ and ‘criminals, drug
dealers, [and] rapists.’”136 The Regents complaints additionally quote
President Trump’s 2017 statement comparing undocumented immi-
grants to ‘animals’ responsible for ‘the drugs, the gangs, the cartels,
the crisis of smuggling and trafficking, [and] MS13.’”137 The majority
of the complaints in the litigation contained voluminous discrimina-
tory statements by President Trump.138
In addition, the underlying complaints contained more evidence
of a possible discriminatory animus, including:
President Trump’s statements and actions reflect a pattern of
bias against Mexicans and Latinos. For example, on February 24,
2015, President Trump demanded that Mexico “stop sending
131. Id. at 1897.
132. Id. at 1917–18.
133. Id.
134. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 140 S. Ct. at 1917–18.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 1917 (citing Complaint at ¶ 91, Batalla Vidal v. Nielsen, 291 F. Supp. 3d
260 (E.D.N.Y. 2018) (No. 1:16-cv-04756) (“In his presidential announcement speech,
then-candidate Trump stated: ‘When Mexico sends its people, they’re not sending their
best . . . . They’re sending people that have lots of problems, and they’re bringing those
problems with us. They’re bringing drugs. They’re bringing crime. They’re rapists.’ ”)).
137. Id. (citing Complaint at ¶¶ 101–13, 124, Garcia v. United States, No. 3:17-cv-05
380-JCS (N.D. Cal. filed Sept. 18, 2017)).
138. See Complaint at ¶¶ 91–100, Batalla Vidal v. Nielsen, No. 1:16-cv-04756(NGG)
(JO) (291 F. Supp. 3d 260) (containing Trump’s discriminatory statements); Complaint,
Santa Clara Cty. v. Trump, No. 5:17-cv-05813 (N.D. Cal. filed Oct. 10, 2017); Complaint
at ¶¶ 101–13, 124, Garcia v. United States, No. 3:17-cv-05380 (N.D. Cal. filed Sep. 18,
2017); Complaint at ¶¶ 1, 32–35, Cty. of San Jose v. Trump, No. 3:17-cv-05329-WHA
(N.D. Cal. filed Sept. 14, 2017); Complaint at 239–49, New York v. Trump, No. 1:17-cv-
05228 (E.D.N.Y. filed Sept. 6, 2017).
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criminals over our border.” On March 5, 2015, President Trump
tweeted that he “want[ed] nothing to do with Mexico other than
to build an impenetrable WALL . . . .”139
Since his inauguration, Defendant Trump has continued to ex-
press animus toward Mexicans and Latinos through both his
words and actions. In August 2017, in a speech in Arizona,
Defendant Trump described some undocumented immigrants as
“animals.”140
On August 25, 2017, President Trump pardoned former Maricopa
County Sheriff Joe Arpaio, who was to be sentenced for criminal
contempt for failing to comply with a federal judge’s order to
stop racially profiling Latinos.141
The dissent focused on how the President’s racist statements pro-
vided the main reason for which DACA was rescinded.142 She high-
lighted how, if the facts asserted in each consolidated case complaints
were developed, it might lead to a demonstration of a violation of
the Equal Protection Clause.143 “Taken together, ‘the words of the
President’ help to ‘create the strong perception’ that the rescission
decision was ‘contaminated by impermissible discriminatory animus.’
This perception provides respondents with grounds to litigate their
equal protection claims further.”144
Second, the dissent challenged the majority’s minimization of
the disproportionate impact of the recission on the Latinx commu-
nity.145 The majority asserted that the equal protection claim fails
where any immigration policy will per se have a disproportionate
impact on the Latinx community.146 In response, the dissent asserted
that the impact of the rescission could not be viewed in isolation
from, but within, “the context of the President’s public statements
on and off the campaign trail.”147
Referencing back to the procedural posture of the case, Justice
Sotomayor asserted that because the case was only at the motion-to-
dismiss stage, the case needed to be remanded for further explora-
tion of whether the executive action “disproportionately harms the
139. Complaint at 101, Garcia, No. 3:17-cv-05380.
140. Complaint at 97, Batalla Vidal, 291 F. Supp. 3d 260.
141. Complaint at 249, Trump, No. 1:17-cv-05228.
142. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 140 S. Ct. at 1917.
143. Id.
144. Id. (quoting Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2391, 2440 (2018) (Sotomayor, J.,
dissenting)).
145. Id. at 1917–18.
146. Id. at 1915.
147. Id. at 1918.
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same racial group that the President branded as less desirable mere
months earlier.”148 To Sotomayor, the timing of the change in policy
demonstrated that legality of DACA was pretextual.149 She suggested
that the abruptness of the change demonstrated an incongruence
between the decision and the rationale.150
Ultimately, her dissent stressed the importance of adherence to
procedure, which reinforces the legitimacy of the Supreme Court.151
Here, the failure to permit the full development of the discrimination
claims, in light of the President’s statements, undermines the legiti-
macy of the court system.152 The legitimacy of court procedures and
allowing the respondent’s claims to be fully developed is significant,
given the manner in which court systems in the United States have
served as an instrument of discrimination against marginalized com-
munities. Justice Sotomayor’s adherence to procedure is grounded
in ensuring public confidence in the system, rather than ensuring
a particular outcome. When the rules have not been followed and the
outcome is against the litigant, it does not inspire public trust and
confidence that the court has reached the right result.153
B. Wolf v. Cook County
In Wolf v. Cook County, the Administration petitioned the Su-
preme Court to overturn a preliminary injunction to enforce its regu-
lation changing the parameters of when a noncitizen under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1182(a)(4)(A) would be inadmissible based upon their likelihood of
becoming dependent on the state—becoming a public charge.154 “This
new regulation . . . defines a ‘public charge’ as ‘an alien who receives
one or more designated public benefits for more than 12 months in
the aggregate within any 36-month period (such that, for instance,
receipt of two benefits in one month counts as two months).’”155
The majority decision lifted the district court’s granting of a
preliminary injunction, allowing enforcement pending the disposi-
tion of the Government’s appeal in the Seventh Circuit.156 It is not
typical for the Supreme Court to issue an opinion on an order granting
a preliminary injunction.157 Justice Sotomayor wrote a dissenting
148. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 140 S. Ct. at 1918.
149. See id.
150. Id. (citing Dep’t of Com. v. New York, 139 S. Ct. 2551, 2575 (2019)).
151. See id. at 1926–29.
152. See id. at 1918–19.
153. See Sotomayor & Greenhouse, supra note 19, at 376.
154. See Wolf v. Cook Cnty., 140 S. Ct. 681, 681 (2020).
155. Id. at 681–82 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(4)(A)).
156. See id. at 681.
157. See id.
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opinion highlighting the procedural irregularity and the Administra-
tion’s reflexive use of petitioning the Court before cases are ripe for
judicial review.158
Again, Justice Sotomayor’s dissent focused on strict adherence
to procedure.159 She admonished the Court’s affirming the Adminis-
tration’s request for it to overturn two lower courts’ grant of a stay.160
She cited this as “a now-familiar pattern”161 and “‘th[e] exceptional
mechanism’ of stay relief ‘as a new normal.’”162 In her dissent, speak-
ing to her colleagues, she encouraged the Supreme Court to remem-
ber the standard the government must meet in order to obtain a stay
and reminded the government that it cannot simply presume that
it will obtain the assent of five Justices on the legal issues.163 The
standard is a higher standard when the government—or a party—
seeks to depart from the standard rules of appellate procedure.164
In other cases, the Administration argued that Supreme Court
intervention was necessary where the district court issued nation-
wide injunctions.165 This case can be distinguished because both the
district court and the Seventh Circuit issued injunctions that were
only applicable to the state of Illinois, not the entire country.166
Justice Sotomayor called out the Administration in what is becom-
ing a familiar pattern of petitioning the Supreme Court before a
case is ripe for review:
Claiming one emergency after another, the Government has re-
cently sought stays in an unprecedented number of cases,
demanding immediate attention and consuming limited Court
resources in each. And with each successive application, of course,
its cries of urgency ring increasingly hollow. Indeed, its behavior
relating to the public-charge rule in particular shows how much
its own definition of irreparable harm has shifted. Having first
sought a stay in the New York cases based, in large part, on the
purported harm created by a nationwide injunction, it now dis-
claims that rationale and insists that the harm is its temporary
inability to enforce its goals in one State.167
158. See id. at 682.
159. See id. at 682–83.
160. Wolf, 140 S. Ct. at 681–82.
161. Id. at 681.
162. Id. at 683 (citing Barr v. East Bay Sanctuary Covenant, 140 S. Ct. 3, 6 (2019)
(Sotomayor, J., dissenting from grant of stay)).
163. See id. at 683–84.
164. See id. at 683 (citing Packwood v. Senate Select Comm. on Ethics, 510 U.S. 1319,
1320 (1994)).
165. Id.
166. See Wolf, 140 S. Ct. at 682–83.
167. Id. at 683.
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Her dissent focused on how the failure to adhere to basic rules of
appellate procedure creates a “disparity in treatment [that] erodes
the fair and balanced decision-making process that this Court must
strive to protect.”168
C. Barr v. East Bay Sanctuary Covenant
In July 2019, the Administration promulgated an interim rule,
8 C.F.R. § 208, restricting asylum applicants on the southern bor-
der.169 The joint interim rule, 8 C.F.R. § 208, banned all asylum
seekers who enter or attempt to enter the United States across the
southern land border who transit through a safe third country in to
the United States.170 The rule provided that a person in transit must
apply in the countries through which they transited.171 Simulta-
neously, the Administration entered into Asylum Cooperation
Agreements with El Salvador (September 20, 2019),172 Honduras
(September 21, 2019),173 and Guatemala (July 26, 2019).174
In Barr v. East Bay Sanctuary Covenant, legal and social ser-
vice organizations challenged the validity of the joint interim rule.175
Before the Ninth Circuit heard arguments on the merits of the case,
the Administration petitioned the Supreme Court to issue a stay
pending appeal allowing the interim rule to go into effect.176 The
Administration’s petition and the Court’s response were a departure
from normal procedure.177
168. Id. at 684.
169. 8 C.F.R. § 208.13 (c)(4) (2019).
170. Id.
171. See id.
172. See Press Release, Joint Statement Between the U.S. Government and the Gov-
ernment of El Salvador, DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC. (Sept. 20, 2019), https://www.dhs.gov
/news/2019/09/20/joint-statement-between-us-government-and-government-el-salvador
[https://perma.cc/7G68-7TQ6].
173. See Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the
Government of the Republic of Honduras for Cooperation in the Examination of Pro-
tection Claims, U.S.-Hond., Sept. 25, 2019, T.I.A.S. No. 20-325; see also Press Release,
Joint Statement Between the U.S. Government and the Government of Honduras, DEP’T
OF HOMELAND SEC. (Sept. 21, 2019), https://www.dhs.gov/news/2019/09/21/joint-state
ment-between-us-government-and-government-honduras [https://perma.cc/G2S7-N3N2].
174. See Agreement between the United States of America and Guatemala, U.S.-
Guat., July 26, 2019, T.I.A.S. No. 04-1229; see also Press Release, Joint Statement
between the U.S. Government and the Government of Guatemala, DEP’T OF HOMELAND
SEC. (July 22, 2019), https://www.dhs.gov/news/2019/07/22/joint-statement-between-us
-government-and-government-guatemala [https://perma.cc/Q32G-B486].
175. See 8 C.F.R. § 208.30 (2019); Barr v. East Bay Sanctuary Covenant, 140 S. Ct. 3,
3 (2019). On June 30, in Capital Area Immigrants’ Rights Coal. v. Trump, the district
court held that the third country agreements were invalid. See No. 1:19-cv-02117-TJK,
2019 WL 3436501 (D.D.C. filed June 30, 2020).
176. See Vladeck, supra note 12, at 143.
177. Id. at 130–31.
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On September 11, 2019, the Supreme Court issued a stay lifting
the Ninth Circuit’s injunction halting the interim rule’s implemen-
tation.178 The Supreme Court’s order allowed the executive branch’s
proposed rule to go into effect pending litigation.179
Justice Sotomayor’s dissent, joined by Justice Ginsburg, was
highly unusual, as the Supreme Court typically does not issue opin-
ions when lifting a stay.180 Her dissent followed a similar pattern,
given her repeated focus on procedural fairness.181 The dissent made
two major points. First, the dissent highlighted the Administration’s
promulgation of a rule without following the standard rulemaking
procedures under the Administrative Procedures Act.182 The dissent
cited to the district court’s opinion, where the court issued an in-
junction halting the enforcement of the government’s rule finding
that the government was unlikely to succeed in the merits of their
case.183 Specifically, the district court found that the government did
not follow the two requisite steps for promulgating the transit ban
regulations under the Administrative Procedures Act (APA).184
Agencies must first publish notice of the proposed rule in the
Federal Register and, second, there must be a public commenting
period.185 During the public commenting period, people may submit
data, opinions or arguments, either written or orally.186 The Admin-
istration did not follow these two steps.187
Sotomayor admonished the Court for lifting the injunction.188 In
allowing the regulation to go into effect, the Court dismantled dec-
ades of asylum procedures.189 She noted that the implementation of
this policy had a disparate impact on “some of the most vulnerable
people in the Western Hemisphere—without affording the public a
chance to weigh in.”190
178. See East Bay Sanctuary Covenant, 140 S. Ct. at 3.
179. See id.
180. Ian Millhiser, The Supreme Court’s Enigmatic “Shadow Docket,” Explained, VOX
(Aug. 11, 2020), https://www.vox.com/2020/8/11/21356913/supreme-court-shadow-docket
-jail-asylum-covid-immigrants-sonia-sotomayor-barnes-ahlman.
181. See East Bay Sanctuary Covenant, 140 S. Ct. at 4.
182. Id. at 4–5.
183. Id. at 5.
184. See id. at 4–5 (citing East Bay Sanctuary Covenant v. Barr, 385 F. Supp. 3d 922,
947 (C.D. Cal. 2019)).
185. See id. at 4 (citing East Bay Sanctuary Covenant, 385 F. Supp. 3d at 947–51).
186. See id. at 4–5 (citing East Bay Sanctuary Covenant, 385 F. Supp. 3d at 947–51).
187. See Barr v. East Bay Sanctuary Covenant, 140 S. Ct. at 5–6 (citing East Bay
Sanctuary Covenant, 385 F. Supp. 3d at 947).
188. Id. at 4–6.
189. Id. at 5.
190. Id.
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Second, the dissent highlighted the Supreme Court’s acquiescence
to the Administration’s petitioning the Court before it properly pro-
ceeded through the court system.191
By granting a stay, the Court simultaneously lags behind and
jumps ahead of the courts below. And in doing so, the Court side-
steps the ordinary judicial process to allow the Government to
implement a rule that bypassed the ordinary rulemaking pro-
cess. I fear that the Court’s precipitous action today risks under-
mining the interbranch governmental processes that encourage
deliberation, public participation, and transparency.192
Here, Justice Sotomayor asserted the need to strictly adhere to
procedure.193 In lifting the injunction, the Court—without issuing an
opinion—was essentially confirming strict deference to the executive
branch’s plenary power over immigration.194 Since 2017, the Admin-
istration has increasingly petitioned the Supreme Court to bypass
district and circuit court nationwide injunctions prior to the case
proceeding through the lower courts.195 The dissent forced the Court
to reconcile its decision with the longstanding practice of failing to rule
on a case prior to it properly proceeding through the lower courts.196
She stated, “[u]nfortunately, it appears the Government has treated
this exceptional mechanism as a new normal. Historically, the Gov-
ernment has made this kind of request rarely; now it does so reflex-
ively.”197 The core principle that emerged from this dissent is that the
Administration is not above the APA and that the Administration’s
use of the Supreme Court to resolve cases before they go through the
proper appellate procedures to the Supreme Court is unacceptable.198
CONCLUSION
Justice Sotomayor’s immigration dissents in cases challenging
executive actions serve three important functions: (1) signal the ways
in which immigration exceptionalism has permitted the abandonment
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. See East Bay Sanctuary Covenant, 140 S. Ct. at 4–5.
194. Id.
195. See Vladeck, supra note 12, at 124, 134.
196. See East Bay Sanctuary Covenant, 140 S. Ct. at 5 (“By granting a stay, the Court
simultaneously lags behind and jumps ahead of the courts below. And in doing so, the
Court sidesteps the ordinary judicial process to allow the Government to implement a
rule that bypassed the ordinary rulemaking process. I fear that the Court’s precipitous
action today risks undermining the interbranch governmental processes that encourage
deliberation, public participation, and transparency.”).
197. Id. at 6.
198. See id. at 4–5.
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of adherence to the rule of law;199 (2) reinforce the need for congres-
sional reform;200 and (3) signal to marginalized communities that
the pretext of regulating immigration and national security do not
provide cover for the Administration’s racist and xenophobic immi-
gration policies.201
Historically, Supreme Court dissents in civil rights cases have
served the important function of holding government institutions
accountable for blatant discrimination and legalized segregation.202
Public commentators have likened Justice Sotomayor’s dissents to
the dissents in 1960s civil rights cases.203 Noting that her dissent in
Trump v. Hawaii
would be like recounting George Wallace’s comments in 1963
about segregation but finding his refusal to allow African Ameri-
cans into an all-white school was based on some legitimate edu-
cational rationale. If Trump shouted from the rooftops, “Of course
I did it to get Muslims!” the majority would no doubt find reason
to disregard the confession. (And isn’t that what he did over and
over again—confess to anti-Muslim bigotry?)204
In the Supreme Court’s history, the most memorable dissents
were written when Justices highlighted the incongruence between
systems of legalized segregation and constitutional norms.205 The
dissents later would become the prevailing norms for affirming the
199. See Ginsburg, supra note 25, at 4 (“A dissent in a Court of last resort is an appeal
. . . to the intelligence of a future day, when a later decision may possibly correct the
error into which the dissenting judge believes the court to have been betrayed.”).
200. See id. at 6–7 (citing as example Justice Ginsburg’s own dissent in Ledbetter v.
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618 (2007)).
201. See id. at 4–5. Justice Ginsburg, in a lecture, creates two main typologies for
dissenting opinions: (1) intelligence of a future day—“A dissent in a Court of last resort
is an appeal . . . to the intelligence of a future day, when a later decision may possibly
correct the error into which the dissenting judge believes the court to have been
betrayed”; and (2) aims to attract immediate public attention and, thereby, to propel leg-
islative change. Id. at 4, 6. I add a third function to her typologies—the public function—
to those whose rights are taken away by the majority, and the Justice signals there is
someone listening. See also Meares & Tyler, supra note 21, at 539 (“Justice [Sotomayor]
has her finger on the pulse of the American public and hence has a good sense of how to
create and maintain legitimacy for the Court and its decisions.”).
202. See, e.g., Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 564 (1857) (Curtis, J., dissenting),
superseded by constitutional amendment, U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; The Civil Rights Cases,
109 U.S. 3, 26 (1883) (Harlan, J., dissenting); Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 552
(1896) (Curtis, J., dissenting), overruled by Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
203. See Jennifer Rubin, Sotomayor’s Searing Dissent is Worth Savoring, WASH.POST
(June 27, 2018, 9:15 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/right-turn/wp/2018/06
/27/sotomayors-searing-dissent-is-worth-savoring [http://perma.cc/4X6B-RDY6].
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853, 855–56 (1997).
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right of African Americans to equal protection under the law.206 His-
toric Supreme Court dissents were written in Dred Scott v. Sandford
(1857),207 Civil Rights Cases (1883),208 and Plessy v. Ferguson (1896).209
In these cases, the majority refused to acknowledge the humanity
of African Americans, which was an official legal endorsement of
racial segregation and discrimination against African Americans.210
Like the infamous civil rights dissents, Justice Sotomayor calls
attention to the ways in which immigration laws have operated in
a vacuum of exceptionalism that has resulted in the abrogation of
immigrant’s fundamental constitutional rights.211 She highlights
with clarity how the adherence to rule of law and upholding immi-
grant’s fundamental rights within the Constitution do not permit
this Administration—in the name of sovereignty and national
security—to act with impunity when racist and xenophobic state-
ments provide the context for their policies.212 Recognizing the power
of dissenting opinions herself, Justice Sotomayor highlighted the
similarity between her dissent in Trump v. Hawaii and Justice
Murphy’s dissent in Korematsu.213 Both dissents called attention to
national security justifying immigration policies that are cover for
discriminatory animus.214
Justice Sotomayor’s dissents are written in a context where the
President has sought to enforce executive actions that are connected
to discriminatory and xenophobic statements during his campaign
and while in office.215 Her dissents demand strict adherence to proce-
dure, while forcing the Court to recognize the discriminatory and
xenophobic rhetoric that has driven its immigration policy agenda.
Accordingly, her dissents provide wisdom to a future day where im-
migration authority does not reign supreme in the face of blatant
discriminatory and xenophobic immigration laws and policies.
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